

12-2024

13 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Comments on Inspector General Requirements Survey

1. The Inspector General's requirements survey is an intellectual tour de force of the first order. Although overly discursive, it is intensely readable and replete with penetrating insights and forthright observations on the requirements problem. Because the analysis is thorough and fundamentally sound, frequently graced by trenchant commentary on specific issues, it is indeed a pity that the recommendations as a whole are lack-lustre and feckless. But such is the case and candor prevents my describing them otherwise.

2. Herein I shall not attempt to offer detailed views on the multifold facets of the requirements problem; rather it would seem more appropriate to limit consideration to the broader problems inherent in the set of recommendations intended to correct the situation. For while the study does an estimable job of identifying issues, illustrating the complexity of the problem, and recognizing the many peripheral but vital questions associated with requirements, it does not meet the management issue squarely. And this is the heart of the matter. Management responsibility for our requirements system has settled at lower levels and clearly has been given inadequate top management attention, even though the problems concerned are Agency-wide and vital to the interests of the Director. Thus I would state that, while the effective improvement of the requirements process will need further detailed analysis, even more imperative are strong, central monitoring and supervision.

3. The survey points out that during the past several years there has been an over-all proliferation of responsibility for running the requirements "system" in spite of the fact that some consolidation has taken place. For example, the study identifies some 20 different primary entities which are responsible for execution of various recommendations. Should all these entities initiate action simultaneously, chaos would probably ensue. Surely,

some centralization of responsibility would seem to be in order. Yet we find the survey telling us: "Our best hope is that the necessity for restraint will gradually percolate downward and outward over time." I doubt that the Agency can afford to rely on percolation; instead, it must have firm and continuing direction of the requirements effort from the top, as well as a definite implementation plan.

4. I recommend, therefore, the appointment of a special assistant to the DCI or to the DDCI with the over-all authority and responsibility for creating an orderly system, using such recommendations of the survey as appear helpful. I also suggest that this person be charged with making more detailed studies of various aspects of the problem, seeking the advice and counsel of the responsible officials, including particularly the Deputy Directors. The creation of this special assistant with a small staff is not necessarily a desirable permanent arrangement, but it is needed at least until there is developed an effective line operation to control the problem.

5. Once operational authority and responsibility have been established, I believe firm and constant direction from the top will be essential. Broad and basic policy decisions will be required and implementation of the directives derived therefrom must be levied by and supervised from the highest level. I feel that something along these lines is what the Director meant in his November 1966 memorandum to the four Deputy Directors in which he said:

"On requirements in general, for all phases of our collection and processing functions, resources are to be planned for or committed only when the validity of the requirements from whatever source have been carefully reviewed. This hard look applies to the entire requirements picture -- their initiation as well as satisfaction -- including again, those of common concern to be serviced by CIA."

6. Many of the current internal Agency requirements problems are created by forces outside direct Agency control. Accordingly, any action taken inside the Agency will inevitably have inter-agency repercussions. The special assistant, therefore, should also be charged with suggesting solutions for those requirements problems pertaining to the Director of Central Intelligence and his relationship to the intelligence community.

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Acting Director of Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting

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